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Abstract Formal verification of agents representing robot behaviour is
a growing area due to the demand that autonomous systems have to be
proven safe. In this paper we present an abstract definition of autonomy
which can be used to model autonomous scenarios and propose the use
of small-scale simulation models representing abstract actions to infer
quantitative data. To demonstrate the applicability of the approach we
build and verify a model of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in an
exemplary autonomous scenario, utilising this approach.
1 Introduction
Autonomous systems have the ability to decide at run-time what to do and how
to do it. A critical question is how this decision making process is implemented.
Increasingly, autonomous systems are being deployed within the public do-
main (e.g. driverless cars, delivery drones). Naturally, there is concern that these
systems are reliable, efficient and - most of all - safe. Although testing is a ne-
cessary part of this process, simulation and formal verification are key tools,
especially at the early stages of design where experimental testing is both in-
feasible and dangerous. Simulation allows us to view the continuous dynamics
and monitor behaviour of a system. On the other hand, model checking allows us
to formally verify properties of a finite representation. Whereas the simulation
model is close to an implementation, simulation runs are necessarily incomplete.
Verification models, on the other hand, require us to abstract more coarsely.
The decisions made by an autonomous agent depend on the current state of
the environment, specifically in terms of data perceived by the agent from its
sensors. If model checking is to be used for the verification of autonomous systems
we must reflect the uncertainty associated with the state of the environment by
using probabilistic model checking.
We propose a framework for analysing autonomous systems, specifically to
investigate decision-making, using probabilistic model checking of an abstract
model where quantitative data for abstract actions is derived from small-scale
simulation models. We illustrate our approach for an example system composed
of a UAV searching for and collecting objects in an arena. The simulation models
for abstract actions are generated using the object-oriented framework Simulink
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and the abstract models are specified and verified using the probabilistic model
checker PRISM. In our example, autonomous decision making involves making
a weighted choice between a set of possible actions, and is loosely based on the
Belief-Desire-Intention architecture [7].
Previous work in which model checking is used to verify autonomy includes
[3] in which the decision making process is verified in isolation, while our aim is
to integrate this process with the autonomous agent as a whole. Other research
includes an investigation of the cooperative behaviour of robots, where each
robot is represented by a hybrid automaton [1], and verification of a consensus
algorithm using experimental verification and an external observer [2].
2 Autonomy
In order to formally define autonomous behaviour, we introduce finite state
machines which abstract the autonomous actions independent of the agent type.
Before we give the formal definitions we require the following notation. For a
finite set of variables V , a valuation of V is a function s mapping each variable
in V to a value in its finite domain. Let val(V ) be the set of valuations of V . For
any s ∈ val(V ), v ∈ V and value x of V , let s[v:=x] and s[v±x] be the valuations
where for any v′ ∈ V we have s[v:=x](v′) = x and s[v±x](v′) = s(v′)±x if v′=v
and s[v:=x](v′) = s[v±x](v′) = s(v′) otherwise. For a finite set X, a probability
distribution over X is a function µ : X → [0, 1] such that ∑x∈X µ(x) = 1. Let
Dist(X) be the set of distributions over X.
Definition 1. A probabilistic finite-state machine is a tuple M=(V, I, A, T )
where: V is a finite set of variables; I ⊆ val(V ) a set of initial states; A a finite
set of actions and T : val(V )×A→ Dist(S) a (partial) transition function.
The set of states ofM=(V, I, A, T ), denoted S, is the set of valuations val(V ) of
V . Let A(s) denote the actions available from state s, i.e. the actions a ∈ A for
which T (s, a) is defined. In state s an action is chosen non-deterministically from
the available actions A(s) and, if action a is chosen, the transition to the next
state is made according to the probability distribution T (s, a). A probabilistic
finite-state machine describes a system without autonomy, we introduce this
through a weight function adding decision making to the finite-state machine.
Definition 2. An autonomous probabilistic finite-state machine is a tuple A =
(V, I, A, T, w) where (V, I, A, T ) is a probabilistic finite-state machine and w is
a weight function w : val(V )×A → [0, 1] such that for any s ∈ val(V ) and
a 6= b ∈ A we have w(s, a) 6= w(s, b) and w(s, a)>0 implies a ∈ A(s).
In an autonomous machine the non-determinism in the first step of a transition
is removed. More precisely, if a machine A=(V, I, A, T, w) is in state s, then the
action performed is that with the largest weight, that is the action:
as,w = arg max{w(s, a) | a ∈ A(s)} .
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Requiring the weights for distinct actions and the same state to be different
ensures this action is always well defined. Having removed the non-determinism
through the introduction of a weight function, the semantics of an autonomous
finite state machine is a discrete time Markov chain.
3 UAV Example
In this case study we consider a specific example (a simple search and retrieve
example, with a UAV in a finite sized arena) to demonstrate our approach.
The UAV first takes off and checks whether the system and sensors are func-
tional. If the UAV detects an issue in the system, then it returns to base. Other-
wise it will proceed to search for a given number of objects. When an object is
found, the UAV positions itself above the object and descends until the grabber
can pick it up. The UAV then ascends to transportation height and transports
the object to the deposit site. There is the possibility that the UAV will drop
its object along the way and need to retrieve it. Once the UAV is above the
deposit site, it releases the object and ascends back to search height. It will then
decide whether it continues the search or returns to the base and complete the
mission. During operation, the UAV may return to base to recharge if it is low
on battery, or conduct an emergency landing, due to an internal system error. If
the mission time limit is reached, the UAV abandons the mission and returns to
base. Figure 1 represents this scenario, showing the different modes of the UAV
and progression between the modes.
We represent this scenario using a autonomous finite-state machine A. The
variables V of A are given by:
– obj the number of objects which have not been found;
– pos=(posx, posy) the position of the UAV in the arena;
– ret=(retx, rety) the return coordinates when search is interrupted;
– m the current mode of the UAV;
– t the mission time;
– b the battery charge level.
Each state s ∈ val(V ) of A is a valuation of these variables. The transition and
weight functions T and w are based on Figure 1. We focus on the target approach
and search modes of the UAV.
In the target approach mode (m=4), the UAV positions itself above an ob-
served object and we denote this abstract action by Approach. Thus, the weight
function is w(s,Approach)=1 for all states s such that s(m)=2, and for any such
state s we have for any s′ ∈ S:
T (s,Approach)(s′) =
{
1 if s′ = s[m:=5][t+Tap ][b−Bap ]
0 otherwise
where Tap and Bap are the time and battery charge used approaching the object,
and m=5 is the mode for descending. The abstract action Approach models
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Figure 1. The finite state machine representing the scenario.
several different operations of the UAV including the use of its camera and
navigational system. A small-scale simulation model was built for this abstract
action to provide the required quantitative data.
When the UAV is in search mode (m=3) there are two actions that can occur:
Search and BatteryLow with the UAV continuing search if the battery charge
level is above a certain threshold, and returning to base otherwise. The weight
function for the Search action from any state s such that s(m)=3 is given by:
w(s,Search) =
{
0 if s(b) ≤ Blow
1 if s(b) > Blow
and for the BatteryLow action we have w(s,BatteryLow) = 1−w(s,Search).
Concerning the transition function we have for any s′ ∈ S:
T (s,Search)(s′) =

1− α if s′ = s[pos:=∆pos][t+∆t][b−∆b]
α if s′ = s[pos:=∆pos][ret :=∆pos][m:=4][t+∆t][b−∆b]
0 otherwise
and T (s,BatteryLow)(s)=1 if s′=s[pos:=∆pos][ret :=∆pos][m:=12][t+∆t][b−∆b]
and 0 otherwise, where ∆pos denotes the movement from one discrete square in
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(a) Scenario 1. (b) Scenario 2.
Figure 2. Probability of completing the mission successfully by deadline T .
the arena to the next, ∆t and ∆b are the time and battery consumption of the
UAV while moving one square. The UAV has probability α of finding an object
in a given position, if an object is found the UAV changes to mode m=4 and ret
is set to the current coordinates, as the search has been interrupted. If no object
is found, the UAV continues searching.
4 Results
We have modelled our scenario in the probabilistic model checker PRISM [5],
building small-scale simulation models to determine individual abstract actions
to generate probabilistic and timing values. To encode the timing values in
PRISM as integer variables we take the floor and ceiling, introducing non-
determinism into the model and upper and lower bounds for properties [4]. The
experiments were performed on a computer with 16GB RAM and a 2.3 GHz
Intel Core i5 processor.
The main properties of interest concern the UAV successfully completing the
mission (finding and depositing all objects within the time limit) and failing the
mission (either due to an emergency landing, missing some objects or running
out of time). We have also considered other properties including how often the
UAV drops an object and how often it recharges during a mission, more details
can be found in the repository [6].
We have analysed two scenarios where there are 3 objects and a time limit of
900s, and 2 objects and a time limit of 500s respectively. For the first scenario
the model has 116 191 709 states, was built in 488s and verifying a property
varied between 298s and 813s. This is far more efficient than running Monte
Carlo simulations, as simulating 10 000 runs of the same scenario takes over
two weeks. For the second scenario the model has 35 649 503 states and model
construction time was 77s.
For the first scenario, the maximum and minimum probabilities of the UAV
completing a mission are 0.7610 and 0.6787 respectively. The maximum and
minimum probabilities of running out of time are negligible, searching the arena
and missing some objects are 0.2617 and 0.1808, and 0.0628 and 0.0552 for
performing an emergency landing. Figure 2 shows the maximum and minimum
6 Hoffmann, Ireland, Miller, Norman and Veres
probability of a successful mission within a time bound as well as the results
obtained when the non-determinism is replaced by a uniform random choice.
The probability increases after a threshold time as the UAV has to search a
proportion of the arena before finding all objects.
5 Conclusions
We have proposed using small-scale simulation models to inform probabilistic
models used for verification. The simulation models can be used to provide quant-
itative data for abstract actions. The probabilistic models can be used for fast
property specific verification, that is not possible using simulations alone.
Our approach is highly adaptable; once the initial small-scale simulation and
probabilistic models have been set up, different decision algorithms can be easily
substituted and analysed. Our example illustrates the use of a weight function
for decision making. In a more extensive scenario the weight function would
be more complex (e.g. involving current values associated with all sensors and
guiding systems). Our use of non-determinism when approximating quantitative
data obtained from the small-scale simulation models allows us to provide an
range of uncertainty for our results. We aim to formally prove a link between the
simulation and the abstract model to allow us to infer results from the abstract
model for the actual system. To allow the analysis of more complex scenarios we
plan to incorporate abstraction techniques.
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